Israel and Syria

Today the Israeli Air Force carried out a series of air strikes against Syrian military targets around Damascus.  The proximate reason was the impending transfer of new, better missiles from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.  They have done this twice before, on Friday they hit some targets around Damascus, and in January they hit a convoy near the Lebanese border carrying missiles to Hezbollah.  However, the target list (including a chemical weapons research facility) suggest the Israelis are trying to send a more complex message than simply no new weapons for Hezbollah.

Remember that Israel has only ever lost one war, and that was to Hezbollah in 2006.  Hezbollah remains the only nearby threat capable of inflicting politically significant damage on Israeli civilians. Right now, the worst case scenario for Israeli security is Hezbollah getting Syrian chemical weapons and the missile systems to deliver them.

The Israelis would probably like to stay out of the Syrian conflict entirely.  There is no military action they can take to ensure a palatable outcome. Obviously, there are no political or diplomatic tools they can use either.  That leaves Israel in a bind.  They can handle Assad, but he is an enabler of the Iran - Hezbollah alliance.  What would follow Assad is unknowable at this time.  Could be worse, could be better, will certainly be Islamist.  But won't be in Iran's pocket and probably won't facilitate Hezbollah. 

All in, it looks like a new regime would suit the Israelis.  But of course they cannot take sides.  Israeli support of the rebels would be the kiss of death and the rebels would reject Israeli help.  On the other hand, strategic developments have taken an unusual turn.  As far as Syria is concerned, Israeli and Saudi interests are starting to converge.  Both are lined up against Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon.  Both would be better off with a Sunni ruled Syria.   Both would be happy with a severely crippled Hezbollah.  Neither is a military threat to the other.  Both are American allies.  I'm not expecting a nice meeting between King Abdullah and Netanyahu in East Jerusalem with lots of hugs and kisses.  But I wouldn't be surprised to find out they are cooperating under the table.

Finally, the chemical weapons are a wild card.  Its hard to divine the truth, but it looks like Assad has been using them in a limited fashion.  Trying to gain a tactical advantage without provoking international response.   This is one area where Israel gets a free pass.  They can bomb the shit out of Assad's chemical weapons capabilities and nobody will blame them. 

Its also worth noting that the Israeli raid shows yet again that the Syrian Air Force is utterly incapable of defending Syrian airspace. 

Finally, The Last Iran War Post

      A B-52  Photo:US Air Force

This article in the Guardian is the last nail in the Iran War coffin.  The UK's Attorney General has a legal opinion that use of UK bases for a pre-emptive attack on Iran could be illegal.

The war that I've always said wouldn't happen is now dead.  The US Air Force cannot carry out an extended campaign against Iran without UK bases.  They need UK bases for B52s and Diego Garcia for B2s.  Of course the US could still use their bases in the US and Guam, but that radically reduces the tonnage they can drop.  And use of those bases makes for some difficult overflight problems. The US Navy can still attack from aircraft carriers and the Air Force can use regional bases, but they can't stop the Iranians with conventional weapons.  Without strategic bombing, the only way for the US to destroy the Iranian program is with nuclear weapons.  And that's not on.

You can stick a fork in it now.  We will still hear lots about it, because the general public does not grasp the operational constraints.  But it will be just talk.  This game is over.

UPDATE

I should have said that this kind of finding means, in my opinion, that Britain will not go to war over the idea of Iranian nuclear weapons.   This is a policy document pretending to be a legal document.  It moves Britain closer to the overall European position. 

Yap

Practically the only way to dry the swamp of radical Islam is through economic development and an improved standard of living. 
Yitzhak Rabin

The Syrian Powder Keg

     Aleppo is starting to look like someone's Stalingrad.  Photo by: Niklas Meltio

Things are not going well for Bashar Assad.  His army had pushed the rebels out of Damascus and seemed to be forcing a decisive battle in Aleppo on their terms.  Given the Army's heavy weapons and air assets, it should have been a walkover. But more than a month later, the battle for Aleppo continues.  In addition, after having been driven out of Damascus last month, the rebels are not only back, but seem to have shot down a helicopter.  The Syrian Armed Forces are clearly unable to win this war.  The rebels, on the other hand, have taken everything the government has thrown at them and keep advancing.

The usual scenario in these circumstances is a grinding war until the rebels get the upper hand and the government disintegrates as the players rush for the exits.  Without foreign intervention, that's what will happen here.  Unfortunately, the regional players have upped the stakes in this conflict. And the chemical weapons are a wild card inviting intervention from the US, France, Britain and possibly Russia. 

While we have all been paying attention to Israeli threats against Iran and the Egyptian revolution, a regional war has been brewing to the East.  The US invasion of Iraq upset the regional status quo by shoving Iraq (majority Shia) into Iran's outstretched arms.  Iran gained a straight line of allies all the way to the Mediterranean (Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah).

The Saudis thus feel out-flanked by Iran and threatened by Iranian nukes.  They also felt threatened by Shia demonstrations in the North of the Kingdom, the oil part, and were forced (by their reckoning) to stifle a Shia revolution in Bahrain.  So the emerging power blocks are sectarian; Sunni vs. Shia.  Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Iran's clients on one side, the USA, Turkey, Jordan and the Gulf Arabs on the other. Egypt is a wild card and Israel irrelevant.

The war in Syria is acting like a magnifying glass to focus all these issues in one place.  Iran and the Saudis both lack the military for a direct conflict. One invading and/or conquering the other is not possible.  So the temptation to fight by proxy in Syria is attractive.  But very, very dangerous.  Expect an international crisis at some point this fall.

Syria Primer

Currently, Syria is run by an Alawite regime headed by Bashar al-Assad. The Alawite are a group of tribes from western Syria and make up between 10% and 20% of the population depending on who you ask. These tribes practice a form of Shia Islam, in contrast to the majority of the population who are Sunni.

The Alawite have been in control since the sixties when Bashar's father, Hafez al-Assad took over in a coup. Hafez was a master politician, though a brutal and repressive dictator. Bashar is not in the same league and many feel he is first among a group that lead the regime, but not a real force on his own.

Last year, public demonstrations against the regime began, like elsewhere in the Arab world. As the government brutally and ineffectually sought to crush the demonstrations, they gradually became a rebellion.  The rebellion itself is divided and includes groups with many different agendas. The only thing they seem to agree on is that the regime has to go (and that they don't like Israel, but that's mom and apple pie in the Arab world).

This year, the rebellion became strong enough to compete with the government in rural areas, and has taken over large swaths of the country. Lately, they have been contesting urban areas, with less success.  However, they have survived a month of combat in Damascus, and three weeks of heavy combat in Aleppo.

Several factors, including the attack on Damascus, and the spectacular assasination of Bashar's top security officials have made it clear that the regime is probably doomed. When the trickle of defections becomes a flood, the end will be at hand.

But nothing is simple in the Middle East. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq Turkey, Qatar and the United States are intervening directly or indirectly. The Russians don't want to lose their last significant Arab client state. The Iranians don't want to see a Shiite regime overthrown, plus Syria is a key strategic ally, helping them get stuff to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Saudis want very much to have a Shiite regime replaced with a Sunni, and they are funneling guns to the rebels, as is the US (presumably via Qatar). Israel is on red alert, but can't do anything to influence events. So they make concerned noises, but will do nothing unless the chemical weapons come into play. 

The chemical weapons are a new factor. The regime moved some out of rebel held areas recently. This was viewed as a good thing by both the US and the Russians. Both remain concerned (as does Israel) that the weapons could fall into the hands of "terrorists". The Russians are said to have warned Assad in very direct language that these weapons must be secured and cannot be used, period.

At the moment, with all the confusion on the ground and the mad spinning by all sides, it is impossible to tell for sure what is going on.

In any case, the most likely outcome is the fall of the regime and the death of many Alawites. Who will replace them and on what terms is unknowable at this point. Just don't believe everything you read.

The War That Wasn't Still Isn't

    Crazy cool shades, bro                                                                                                 Photo from Speigle

There is a lot of talk about a war with Iran.  Faithful readers will recall that I said the best chance for a US strike passed when Tony Blair resigned.  But let's spare the tortuous history,  here are a few points that have mostly been consistent since this started.

• Israel cannot, with conventional weapons, knock out the Iranian atomic program. They simply can't deliver enough ordinance at that distance.  Their problems are most recently outlined here.

• Likewise, the US can do a LOT more damage than Israel, but things may be past the point where they could deliver a knock-out blow either.  At least with conventional weapons. 

• A nuclear attack on Iran is not an option.  The weapons would have to penetrate deeply into the ground before exploding in order to get at buried facilities.  This would result in massive radioactive fallout over Eastern Iran, Pakistan and India. With attendant casualties.

• No action by the US and/or Israel can bring about regime change in Tehran.  So the essential problem can't be solved by military means.

• No matter what, an Iranian bomb is not a threat to the US, Europe, China, Russia or India.  If the world can live with a nuclear Pakistan, then we can live with a nuclear Iran.

Besides these points, there are some new ones.

• Relations between Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are terrible.  Neither likes or trusts the other.  Obama will go out on a limb for Israel, but he won't lift a finger to help Netanyahu.

• Jerusalem and Washington are talking the same language, but the words don't mean the same thing.  Obama doesn't want the Iranians to build a bomb.  Netanyahu doesn't want them to be able to build a bomb.  For him, the red line has already been crossed.  For Obama, the line won't be crossed for years, if ever.

• Lastly, the most pressing issue in the Mid-East is Syria.  Syria sits on just about every fault line in the region and is now in civil war.  It won't end well and the implications are both far reaching and difficult to predict.

When you add all these factors together, it looks like war will be harder than peace.  I don't expect an attack by Israel or the US anytime soon.

Israel, Iran and Nukes

Flight distances via the Saudi option.  Assumes take-off from Negev bases. Israel has 25 F-15 variants with a range of 2,200km and a large number of F-16s with a range of 2,000km.  They have some aerial refueling capability, but not for the 100 planes thought necessary for an effective attack.


As discussed before, some people believe Israel can and should attack Iran to prevent its acquisition of nuclear weapons.  However, proponents rarely deal with the operational realities of such a strike.  The Israeli Air Force is brilliant, but not magic.  They can do no more than token damage to the Iranian nuclear program for several reasons:

A raid would push Israeli planes to their farthest range, leaving very little time to deliver weapons.  There would be no margin for winds, equipment variation, weather or other unforseeable variables.  Here is an article that discusses range in detail.

The route to Iran has to cross either Turkish or Iraqi airspace.  Also Syria or Jordan, but they don't matter.  The Turks have the means to see the Israelis coming, so use of their airspace would have to blessed ahead of time.  In addition, Turkey is a NATO country.  A violation of their airspace by the Israelis would theoretically put them at war with all the other NATO countries.  Not a happy option for anyone. 

Crossing Iraq is even more problematic.  Iraqi airspace is controlled by the US Air Force.  The Israelis can't sneak through unnoticed, and it would be political suicide for the Americans to allow it.   They can't even pretend not to notice.  A 100+ plane strike force passing twice through USAF defenses suggests that anyone can penetrate US controlled airspace any time they want.

Word surfaced today that Saudi Arabia might allow an Israeli overflight.  I don't know if I buy it.  Even if true, it doesn't do the Israelis much good unless the Saudis allow them to land and refuel.  The Saudi route is well out of the way and at least some Israeli planes wouldn't be able to reach their targets.  Also, the Saudis are a conservative bunch unlikely to take such a spectacular political gamble.

But, let's assume the IAF somehow gets to Iranian airspace and have to cross hundreds of miles to reach their targets.  All the time subject to Iranian air defense measures.  These defenses would be concentrated around the targets the Israelis want to hit.  Significant losses at this stage would jeopardize the effectiveness of the mission. Wrecked Israeli planes on Iranian TV would be bad.  Dead Israeli pilots on Iranian TV would be worse.  But worst of all would be Ahmadinejad on TV sitting beside a captured Israeli.  There are enormous political downsides for Israeli politicians. 

For the sake of argument, however, let's continue with our assumptions and say that the Israelis evade or neutralize Iranian air defenses.  Due to the size of the IAF and the range of their equipment, they would not be able to deliver an overwhelming amount of ordinance.  They could probably destroy the Bushir reactor and other targets.  But the most important sites, like Natanz are underground and would require multiple sequenced precision hits from bunker buster bombs.  And even then the damage might not be catastrophic. 

There are various estimates floating around the web of the total damage the Israelis could inflict.  They vary between no delay at all to the Iranian program up to a five year disruption.  The consensus is a 2 year delay would be the best case.  With conventional weapons, they can do no more. 

If they want to deliver a knock-out blow to the Iranian nuclear program, there is only one option, nuclear weapons.  By using a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles, they could completely destroy the Iranian facilities.  The cruise missiles could be launched by submarines in the Arabian Sea and the ballistic missiles go too high to violate anyone's airspace.  As well, these delivery vehicles are almost impossible to defend against.  So nukes would solve all the Israeli operational issues. Obviously, the use of nuclear weapons would  create significant political problems internally and with their allies.

One thing we learned from the Cold War is that people with nuclear weapons get really serious and really rational really fast. If the Iranians did obtain a weapon, the last thing they'd do is use it against Israel because the result would be annihilation.  As soon as the Iranians had a second-strike capability, the prospect of a nuclear war between the two countries would vanish.  Nuclear weapons are only good for one thing, keeping someone else from nuking you.  They can't be used against non-nuclear states for fear of world reaction.  They can't be used against nuclear states with a second strike capability because the result will be a black heap of rubble where your capital city used to be.  What if you attack and some or all of your weapons don't work?  Its just too risky.

But really, its hard to argue with Iran's ambitions.  Given what they've been through and the threats from Jerusalem and Washington over the last 8 years, they'd be fools not to proceed.  And Iran doesn't actually need a warehouse full of completed weapons.  It needs the capability and resources to assemble and deliver several bomb in a short period of time.   If we can live with a nuclear Pakistan, then we can live with a nuclear Iran.